![]() The only provision of the 1954 Decree that remains operative today is Section V, which prevents Kodak from “ying or otherwise connecting in any manner the sale of its color film to the processing thereof.” The broad language of Section V precludes Kodak from engaging in the otherwise lawful practice of bundling its film and photofinishing services.Ģ. Today's Markets for Film and Photofinishing Kodak fully complied with this requirement. The decree principally required Kodak to make its color photofinishing technology available to competitors. The government filed suit to stop this practice, and, prior to trial, Kodak and the government entered into the 1954 Decree. Since Kodak sold approximately 90 percent of the color film in the United States during that time, this practice allowed Kodak to maintain a 90-percent share of the photofinishing market as well. Until the 1954 Decree, the sales price of Kodak color film included Kodak photofinishing. The 1954 Decree concerned Kodak's practice of tying its photographic film and photofinishing services. ” Sections VI and VII of the decree enjoin Kodak from entering into exclusive dealing contracts and from imposing other restraints on its dealers. Section X of the decree prevents Kodak from selling private-label film by requiring its products to “be labeled in such manner as to show clearly that the is manufactured by. A number of these restrictions remain in force today. In the longer term, the consent decree proscribed certain sales and distribution practices that the government believed to be anti-competitive. These provisions were satisfied long ago. In the short term, the decree required Kodak to divest itself of many of its acquisitions so as to “effectually dissolve the combination found to exist in violation of the statute.” Id. The 1921 Decree imposed both short- and long-term obligations on Kodak. Six years later, while its appeal of the district court's decision still was pending in the Supreme Court, Kodak entered into the 1921 Decree with the government and withdrew its appeal. These proceedings led to a finding by the district court in 1915 that Kodak had monopolized the amateur camera, film, and photofinishing industries through acquisitions and a variety of exclusionary practices. The 1921 Decree arose out of antitrust enforcement proceedings initiated by the government more than 80 years ago. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the order of the district court terminating both the 1921 and the 1954 Decrees. With respect to the 1954 Decree, the district court found that the purpose of the decree-the creation of a competitive photofinishing market-had been accomplished, that neither Kodak nor its affiliates had market power in the photofinishing or film markets, and that allowing Kodak to sell film and photofinishing as a bundle would enhance competition. ![]() In deciding to terminate the 1921 Decree, the district court relied on its findings that Kodak no longer possesses market power over the sale of film and that the elimination of the decree's remaining provisions would benefit consumers. Section V of the 1954 Decree continues to prevent Kodak from selling its film in a “bundle” with its photofinishing services.Īfter a nine-day evidentiary hearing, the district court granted Kodak's motion to terminate both decrees. The second decree was entered in 1954 (“the 1954 Decree”) without any adjudication of law or facts. ![]() Most notably, Section X of the 1921 Decree prevents Kodak from selling “private label” film, which is film marketed under a brand name other than Kodak's, typically that of a retail outlet. The 1921 Decree continues to impose a variety of restrictions on Kodak's business practices. The first decree was entered in 1921 (“the 1921 Decree”) after a finding by the district court that Kodak had monopolized the sale of cameras and photographic supplies. (“Kodak”) to terminate two antitrust consent decrees. ![]() Plaintiff-appellant, the United States of America, appeals from an order entered on in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Telesca, Chief Judge ) granting a motion made by defendant-appellee Eastman Kodak Co. Bell, Wiley, Rein & Fielding, Washington, DC, of counsel) for defendants-appellees. Lascell, Rochester, NY (Hallenbeck, Lascell, Norris & Zorn, Rochester, NY, Robert B. of Justice, Washington, DC, of counsel) for plaintiff-appellant. Decided: August 04, 1995īefore MINER and JACOBS, Circuit Judges, and CEDARBAUM, District Judge.*ĭiane P. EASTMAN KODAK CO., A Corporation of New Jersey, and Eastman Kodak Co., A Corporation of New York, Defendants-Appellees. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. United States Court of Appeals,Second Circuit.
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